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Barber Shops, Salons, and Spas:
The Complexity – and Simplicity – of Implementing Outreach
and Enrollment Contracts Under the Affordable Care Act
INTRODUCTION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into law on
March 23, 2010. Its primary goal was to extend affordable, comprehensive, and
quality public and private health insurance coverage as widely as possible and to
contain growth in health care spending through new regulations on consumer
protections, creation of insurance marketplaces, individual mandates for purchasing
health care, Medicaid expansion, and other reforms. The ACA was implemented
through a complex system of formal and informal arrangements among federal,
state, nonprofit, nongovernmental, and private institutions. This study analyzes the
implementation of a central element of the law in six states, drawing on data we
collected in 2015 and 2016 through semi-structured interviews with forty key
program stakeholders. The objective of our inquiry is to identify factors that
facilitated and inhibited implementation, and their influence on achieving the law’s
objectives.
The ACA is unique in terms of its scope, political controversy, and perhaps
most importantly, its impact on uninsured individuals and the American social
safety net (Nathan, 2016). The law offers an opportunity to examine a variety of
key governance issues including its reliance on inter-organizational collaboration,
and on “market” strategies such as private insurance markets and government
contracting. Like many public programs, the ACA relies on outsourcing as an
important option for not only service delivery, but also for service support such as
outreach, eligibility determination, and enrollment.
One of the prominent requirements of the law was the establishment of
healthcare exchanges (or, marketplaces) through which individuals could review
and purchase health care coverage (Sebelius Testimony, October 30, 2013.) To
enroll qualified people, states were given the option to create their own exchanges
or use the federal exchange – Healthcare.gov. Thirteen states opted for their own
marketplaces, while the rest relied on the federal exchange and its web portals for
state-specific plans and premiums (Kaiser Family Foundation, n.d., State Health
Facts). Successes and failures of the information technology contracts awarded by
state and federal agencies to implement health exchange web sites were widely
publicized in the media and investigated (GAO, 2014).
However, less is known about another key aspect of the ACA
implementation that involved significant contracting activity: outreach and
enrollment services designed to “take-up” eligible uninsured individuals.
Regardless of states’ decisions on the type of marketplace exchange, the law
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required all states to establish navigator programs for outreach and education, and
gave the option to establish separate IPA (in-person assistance) programs with
“assisters” to help individuals with applications and enrollment (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2013).1 All states received substantial federal funding to support their
outreach and enrollment programs, and most states contracted these functions to
nongovernmental organizations. Many of them, in turn, subcontracted with other
entities.
State outreach and enrollment programs were clearly perceived by
policymakers as critical to outreach and enrollment support, meeting program
goals, and enhancing outcomes (Sebelius, 2013). We draw on implementation and
contracting theories to assess states’ contracted outreach and enrollment services,
but we focus primarily on the elements of collaboration and network theories, and
whether and how they emerge in the design and impacts of state strategies. Our
inquiry therefore treats ACA implementation as a case through which we can
examine these theories in the context of a contemporary social welfare innovation
of substantial scope.
We examined ACA outreach and enrollment dynamics in six states. 2 Each
of the states created its own ACA marketplace exchange (as opposed to relying on
the federal exchange). Each also expanded Medicaid to “capture” individuals with
incomes above the previous Medicaid eligibility levels, but below the ACA
premium subsidy thresholds. Although the law’s original requirement for Medicaid
expansion was eliminated due to the Supreme Court’s 2012 National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius decision, each of our sample states retained
Medicaid expansion voluntarily, as an essential element of its insurance expansion
strategy, and contracted with nongovernmental organizations for navigation and
enrollment services.
We observe variation in a set of states that did not differ substantially on the
dimension of support for the ACA. We note that none of these states adopted antiACA stances such as those identified by Rigby (2012); unlike the 32 “resister”
states she identified, none of these states filed lawsuits challenging the law, passed
1

In some states, navigators provide both education/outreach and assistance with applications and
enrollment; in others, states contract with navigators for outreach and education, but contract
separately with assisters for enrollment, and in some states, both types of programs cover all
elements of outreach, education, and enrollment (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013). Private
insurance brokers also served as assisters through marketplace exchange contracts (Corlette,
Blumberg, & Wengle, 2014). Our analysis did not distinguish among the formal types of
outreach/educators/assisters, but instead focused on each state’s overall system for reaching,
educating, and enrolling eligible individuals.
2
The six states are Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, and New York. We
chose these states based on their shared approach to several key aspects of policy implementation,
as well as their variation on several important dimensions that are equally germane to the goal of
the study. We explain our state selection strategy in the Methods section.
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legislation opposing any or all of its elements, or passed up federal implementation
grants. Instead, our sample of states is comparable on the dimension of a
willingness to expand Medicaid and aggressively pursue the ACA’s provisions.
Thus, our focus on this set of states limits the generalizability of the findings, but
benefits from a reasonable level of policy comparability across cases. The latter is
conducive to case study analysis and development of theoretical propositions. We
look for patterns of variation or similarity within a subset of such states to shed
light on how individually tailored state strategies supported the law’s
implementation. In examining the interview data, supplemented with
administrative data and reports, patterns inductively emerged which indicated that
the unique features of the ACA contracts in these states, combined with several
other policy-related or environmental factors, fostered a richly collaborative, less
formalized, explicitly networked approach to reaching eligible individuals than we
might observe in typical contracts. The role and the characteristics of contracting
that might have complicated implementation were, in effect, “drowned out” by
clear patterns of highly collaborative arrangements that involved extensive chains
of diverse outreach/enrollment actors. These actors ranged from experienced health
advocacy professionals to community members recruited to find enrollees in places
where they were likely to congregate such as barbershops, salons, and spas, as well
as churches, schools, and hospitals. In short, the traditional model used in most
social welfare programs – “intake” offices that process applications and determine
eligibility – was replaced with a highly decentralized, outward-focused,
community-based strategy designed to minimize barriers to enrollment.
Our data help explain how the sampled states’ strategies created and
supported collaboration, and how these strategies relate to the observed differences
in the quality of collaboration and, ultimately, the ACA implementation. Our
analysis focuses on questions we posed in the context of state enrollment success
three years into ACA implementation: What were the dominant features of states’
implementation tactics? How did they perform in terms of their sustainability and
the program’s goals? How did states address the challenges related to the
involvement of multiple organizations, sectors, and levels of government, in their
strategies?
In the next section, we provide the context for our research by briefly
reviewing the law, as well as the scholarship on implementation, government
contracting, and collaborative service delivery, all against the intergovernmental
backdrop of the ACA. These themes, as derived from our review, frame our
research questions and inquiry. We then follow with brief introductory summaries
of the marketplaces for each state in our sample. Next, we describe our research
strategy and present the results of our analysis. Finally, we conclude with
implications for the observations that we derive from the patterns identified in the
data.
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THE BACKGROUND OF ACA IMPLEMENTATION
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) includes ten statutory titles and a wide range of
reform elements, all delineated in a highly complex statute that exceeds 1,000 pages
(Thompson, 2013). Peter May (2015) cites “the enormous complexity of the [law]
marked by numerous provisions stitched together in search of a politically viable
policy reform” (p. 277). The law’s complexity, combined with its federal structure
and highly contested politics, suggests that implementation would be fraught with
familiar impediments: goal conflict and related agency problems inherent in a
federal system; buy-in and action required from multiple organizations and actors
(across sectors as well as federal levels); extensive accountability chains;
institutional capacity deficits; and redistributive design, among others (Derthick,
1972; Matland 1995; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1983; O’Toole, 1988; Peterson,
Rabe, and Wong, 1986; Pressman, Wildavsky, 1973; Stoker, 1991; Van Meter and
Van Horn, 1975). Indeed, the granting of implementation authority to states,
reliance on private insurance markets as a foundation, and the inevitable role of
contracting, are all essential components of the policy that had the potential to take
the law through months, if not years, of implementation drag. States’ extensive
stakeholder engagement, combined with agreement among many stakeholders on
the fundamental goal of the law – to increase insurance coverage – may have helped
to reduce friction across organizations, governments, and sectors and result in
improved individual experiences.
Despite attempts by President Trump and Congress since the 2016 election
to “repeal and replace” Obamacare, the ACA had succeeded in extending insurance
to some 20 million previously uninsured individuals by mid-2018 (Sullivan, 2017;
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018). It has also garnered increased
levels of political support. State outreach and enrollment systems have been
successful in reaching sizeable numbers of eligible individuals.3 As described
below, in our six-state sample, there is evidence that many of the typical and
uniquely ACA-related barriers to implementation were overcome through the
design and establishment of effective outreach and enrollment strategies that relied
on collaborative networks of community actors. These networks were able to craft
comparatively simple systems that broke through the implementation complexity
inherent in the law, thereby creating new capacity and achieving significant
enrollment gains.
ACA Implementation and Contracting
Whether or not agencies are “unable” to create a good or service, agencies may be constrained in
terms of staffing resources and flexibility and may face political imperatives to outsource
regardless of capacity.
3
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The United States has a long tradition of reliance on the private sector for the
delivery of public services (Savas, 2000). Contracts for case management for
welfare to work programs, child welfare, Medicaid and other health and human
services delivered through intergovernmental programs, administered jointly by the
federal and state governments, have become common. The ACA – the largest
social welfare and health policy initiative in decades – also relies heavily on
intergovernmental systems.
Responsibility for key aspects of the law’s
implementation was delegated to states, which in turn contracted with a variety of
public and private actors to implement these functions. Many of these actors then
entered into subcontracts, a phenomenon that is sometimes referred to as
“contractual devolution” (Nathan & Gais, 1998).
While one ostensibly positive feature of contracting is a higher degree of
flexibility and, in some cases, cost savings, contract performance can be
complicated by informational asymmetries, low outcome measurability, high-cost
management and oversight systems, or worse, by inadequately funded monitoring
(Anna Amirkhanyan, Meier, & O’Toole, 2017; Johnston & Girth, 2012; Johnston
& Romzek, 2010; Kelman, 2002; Milward & Provan, 2000). For services such as
nursing homes (Amirkhanyan, 2008; Amirkhanyan, 2009; Anna Amirkhanyan,
Kim, & Lambright, 2008), child welfare and other social welfare systems ( Johnston
& Romzek, 2008; Romzek & Johnston, 2005), municipal services (Brown &
Potoski, 2003; Girth, Hefetz, Johnston, & Warner, 2012; Hefetz & Warner, 2004;
Johnston & Girth, 2012) and mental health systems (Milward, Provan, Fish, Isett,
& Huang, 2010), aligning the incentives of the contracted agency with
governmental objectives has proven to be demanding in that it amplifies the
implementation management barriers cited in scholarship on street-level
bureaucracy and bureaucratic discretion (Lipsky, 1980).
For contracts involving intergovernmental programs, complexity is an
inevitable consequence of grafting new regulatory and administrative infrastructure
onto already complex service-delivery, advocacy, and other types of institutions
that encompass multiple organizations, programs, and actors spanning sectors and
governments. In the context of the ACA, these include institutions related to the
Medicaid program, various public health programs, and state-regulated private
health insurance industries, among others. Another salient feature of the ACA’s
implementation environment common to intergovernmental programs is the level
of uncertainty surrounding the future political and financial direction of the entire
program and its various components. As the initial federal grants for navigation
and outreach expired, states with market exchanges grappled with both the
mechanics and level of funding of future navigation and outreach efforts.
While competitive and performance-based contracting might help mitigate
agency problems, in fact many contracts – particularly for social services - are not
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only non-competitive but also long-lasting and collaborative.4 “Relational
contracting,” can engender more collaborative arrangements that limit contract
implementation barriers (though establishing effective “relationships” does impose
transaction costs (DeHoog, 1981; Johnston and Romzek, 2010). Contracting
arrangements embedded in a set of service delivery organizations, may in fact
function like networks (Johnston & Romzek, 2008).
The common mission shared by the ACA and many of the contracted
navigator/assister organizations – the expansion of health insurance coverage to
uninsured individuals – has the potential to alleviate network and contract
management hurdles and to facilitate a more “relational,” cooperative design of
service delivery. In the following section, we use collaboration and networked
governance concepts to further explore the ACA’s implementation.
FRAMING ACA’S IMPLEMENTATION AS A
COLLABORATIVE ENTERPRISE
Isett et al. (2011) define networks as “collections of government agencies,
nonprofits, and for-profits that work together to provide a public good, service or
“value” when a single public agency is unable to create the good or services in the
desired quantities.” 1 Networks are, “by definition…complex conglomerations of
diverse organizations and individuals” (O’Leary and Bingham 2007, p.104). The
foundational structure of networks – multiple organizations, sometimes from
multiple levels of government and from different sectors – introduces a range of
implementation hazards. The greatest challenges in networks have to do with goal
conflict (O’Toole, 1989; Provan & Kenis, 2007; Provan & Milward, 2001),
complexity (May, 2015; Romzek & Johnston, 2002) and potential competition over
scarce resources (Guo & Acar, 2005; Johnston & Romzek, 2008). Each
organization in the network brings its own unique set of interests, constraints,
resources, and cultures to the table (Johnston & Romzek, 2010; O’Leary & Vij,
2012; Romzek & Johnston, 1999). These must be reconciled into a coherent system
that works toward a set of shared over-arching goals.
The most successful networks are collaborative. Collaboration is enhanced
by a prior history of cooperation among the network organizations, and effective
incentives for participation (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Working toward a common goal
does not obviate the need for defining network structure, designing incentives, and
establishing trust to facilitate organizational learning and change.
Collaborative Network Structure: Building Capacity and Aligning Goals
Collaborative governance refers to processes that “engage people constructively across the
boundaries” of organization, government, and sector, for the purpose of achieving an objective
that could not otherwise be met (Emerson et al 2012).
4
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Networks and collaboration are primarily process-oriented systems (Barzelay,
2003; Rhodes & Murray, 2007). Network process features, such as “face-to-face
dialogue, trust building, and the development of commitment and understanding”
create “small wins” that deepen trust, commitment, and shared understanding”
(Ansell and Gash, 2007, p. 543) and help create the added value and synergy that
lead the network to deliver programs, with new capacities, that would be either
impossible or less successful if left to a single organization.
Rhodes and Murray (2007) reinforce the collaboration process perspective
by viewing networks through a “complex adaptive systems framework” that
“allows for the emergence of structure out of the behavior and interaction of agents,
which then influences the next iteration of agent/behavior/interaction” (p. 81). This
framework emphasizes “an unfolding series of events…constrained by the
interdependencies of agents…and the conditions that pre-existed the system’s
coming into being” and “observable path-dependencies in agent behavior” (p. 85).
As Bryson notes, “the more [network] partners have interacted in positive ways in
the past, the more social mechanisms will enable coordination and safeguard
exchanges” (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006, p.46).
Thus, a strategy of tapping into pre-existing relationships to accomplish an
objective is consistent with leveraging the path-dependencies, repeated positive
interactions, and other process elements that characterize successful collaborative
systems. In highly complex environments, these systems therefore may have
already created the infrastructures supportive of adaptation to changing conditions
that emerge externally, among agents/actors in the network, in policies, and in
service delivery strategies.
Networks exhibit a wide range of structures and centralization patterns:
from self-governing networks, dominated by frequent informal interactions, to lead
organization networks that are more centralized, operating under the direction of
one coordinating agency which often holds the monopoly on network power, and
to network administrative organization (NAO) networks in which a separate
agency directs and oversees network activity (K. G. Provan & Kenis, 2007). The
choice of governance structure may influence network effectiveness and
collaboration quality. Provan and Milward (1995) concluded that in the
comparatively formal mental health arena, the more centralized lead organization
networks were most effective in achieving client outcomes.
Organizations and actors in networks use a variety of supplemental informal
mechanisms that enhance both collaboration structures and successful service
delivery ( Amirkhanyan, 2008; Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 2012). These
include capitalizing on shared norms, relationship building, and the use of informal
rewards, sanctions, information sharing, and mutual support to move the full
network toward the service delivery objective (B. Romzek et al., 2014).

Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University, 2019

7

Journal of Public Management & Social Policy, Vol. 26, No. 2 [2019], Art. 8

Collaboration in networks can reduce goal conflict through continual reinforcement
of common missions and strategies that induce cooperation. As noted above,
leveraging and strengthening pre-existing relationships can supplement these
dynamics.
Evidence of Collaboration
Successful collaborations exhibit a set of observable features. Agranoff and
McGuire (2001) argue that successful networks activate the skills, knowledge, and
resources of network members, frame the operative rules that derive from relevant
values and norms, mobilize organizations and coalitions toward a common
objective, and synthesize the actors through coordination and shared goals by
creating “conditions for favorable, productive interaction among network
participants” (p.300), thereby aligning goals, reducing transaction costs, and
enhancing trust and other collaborative synergies. Similarly, “first, second, and
third-order effects” leverage collaborative networks’ added value (Bryson et al.,
2006). First-order effects create “social, intellectual, and political capital,” secondorder effects emerge when collaboration is established, but involve “joint action,
joint learning….changes in practices, and changes in perceptions;” and third-order
effects represent the synergistic outcomes associated with collaboration –
“adaptation of services…new norms…generating social capital (p.51). Rogers and
Weber (2010), studying environmental policy networks, conclude that the
outcomes of successful collaboration include, in addition to program success,
“improving public problem-solving capacity by taking advantage of the
opportunities provided in these collaborative arrangements to tie together and
collectively manage interdependent problems and policies” (p.548). This evidence
of successful collaboration is by no means exhaustive, but it represents key
conclusions in leading scholarship on the topic.
A major policy effort such as the ACA necessarily involved implementation
through numerous actors across multiple organizations and jurisdictions. In the
context of an easily measurable outcome – increased health insurance enrollments
– we use the analytic lenses outlined above to explore the role, the scope, and the
features of the law’s formalized, performance-based contractual and
intergovernmental arrangements, as well as more informal and collaborative interorganizational relationships that were central to effective ACA implementation
networks.
METHODS
Study Sites
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We examined the ACA’s implementation in a purposive sample of six states –
Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, and New York – drawn
from the population of thirteen states that created their own online marketplaces.
Additionally, in terms of the policy itself, our sampled states all expanded Medicaid
eligibility as encouraged by the ACA. While limiting the generalizability of our
observations, focusing on a set of states that share some key aspects of policy
implementation allows us to go deeper into the implementation dynamics in that
specific sub-set of jurisdictions. Focusing on these six states also helps achieve the
level of comparability across cases conducive to identifying rival explanations
(Yin, 2014). Our selection was also based on geographic diversity and, most
importantly, on the variation in the initial assessments of performance of the
exchanges, with the expectation that the performance of outreach and enrollment
contracts might be related. The six sample states also vary on several dimensions
such as size and socio-economic profile.
Connecticut, Kentucky, and New York have been widely judged as
successful in terms of the initial launch of their marketplace exchanges. One year
into the law’s implementation, they experienced notable drops in the rates of
uninsured. In terms of enrollments, one evaluation of enrollment effectiveness,
provided by the Urban Institute’s 2015 data on state enrollments as a percentage of
Urban’s projected levels, presents Colorado and Minnesota as performing below
average, two years into implementation (Holohan et al., 2015). Both of these states
experienced problems with the launches of their marketplace exchanges (but so did
Maryland).
Both Colorado and Minnesota (problematic exchange launches) relied on
quasi-governmental structures established through legislation, but so did
Connecticut (launch success). Kentucky and New York, both successful in terms
of take-up and exchange launch, incorporated their exchanges into the pre-existing
state agencies through executive orders. Maryland struggled early on with a
botched exchange launch, using a quasi-governmental approach mandated by the
state legislation. Thus, it appears that, for this set of states, governance structures
and enabling governmental mechanisms may not explain the variation in the
enrollment take-up three years into implementation.
Of the three states that achieved take-up rates in excess of 30% by 2015 (see
Table 1), only Maryland experienced early exchange problems, but state officials
recovered quickly and performed above expectations by 2015.5 These three states
performed above average in terms of predicted take-up. So did New York, although
its take-up was at 22% in 2015. This number exceeded expectations and may be
attributable to the state’s low pre-ACA rate of uninsured. Thus, exchange launch
success appears to be a relevant, but not the most important predictor of subsequent
5

Maryland quickly purchased computer code from Connecticut to completely re-tool its health
exchange.
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enrollment take-up and reflects positively on the contracting protocols used in these
states. Conversely, in the two states with take-up rates below the expected levels –
Colorado and Minnesota – the exchange launches were complicated, and
contracting practices may have played a role. Three years into implementation,
these two states had still not recovered from their early launch problems. Table 1
presents a snapshot of essential elements of our six states’ ACA implementation
structures and enrollment effectiveness. Table 2 provides more detailed state
program descriptions.
[Tables 1 and 2 about here]
While at this stage of our research we are unable to comprehensively
quantify the collaborative features of these states’ implementation networks, we do
observe that particularly deep community network partnerships in Kentucky and
Maryland may help explain their comparative advantage in reaching eligible
individuals. Colorado certainly also relied on these community connections, but
the depth of ties did not emerge as strongly as the other two states. All six states
reported that their implementation systems were highly complex, and Minnesota
mentioned resource constraints with some frequency. While the most successful
states, in terms of enrollment take-up three years into implementation (Connecticut,
Kentucky, Maryland) clearly relied on leveraging community capacity and
collaborative strategies, these elements, strongest in our interview data in Kentucky
and Maryland, helped to raise these states to the take-up levels exhibited by
Connecticut through its leading early exchange performance.
Interview Strategy and Instrument
While we included deductive elements in our data collection efforts (in the form of
questions whose answers we expect to correlate with respondent and external
perceptions of overall effectiveness), our research strategy is primarily inductive
by nature. As suggested by Agranoff and Radin (1991), we follow a multiple-case
study design that is foundational to public management scholarship (Frederickson
& Frederickson, 2006; Radin & Romzek, 1996; Sandfort, 2000). Within each state,
we sought to maximize the range of perspectives by reaching out to health exchange
staff, state employees representing departments that interfaced with the exchange,
organizations that contracted with (or received grants from) the states to deliver
navigation and outreach services, as well as subcontractor agencies, and advocacy
organizations operating in legislative and program utilization venues. Within each
state, we employed a snowball sampling strategy and completed 40 interviews
across the 6 states. While the snowball sampling strategy precluded us from
identifying an exhaustive list of actors necessary for conducting network analysis,
this strategy can help identify the key features, successes and failures of
implementation, as reported by a broad range of participants. Interview data were
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collected between December 2015 and late summer 2016. All interviews were
recorded, transcribed, extracted, coded, and analyzed using NVivo10. Table 3
provides details on our respondents in each state.
[Table 3 about here]
The interview instrument consists of open-ended questions designed to
capture the perspectives of each respondent about the implementation of ACA
navigation and outreach services within the context of the broader ACA
implementation experience in their state (see Appendix A). The instrument is built
around key research questions as described in the introduction, such as the issues
related to policy implementation, contracting, and collaborative service delivery.
Data Analysis
All qualitative data were imported to and analyzed in QSR NVivo10. The
interviews were coded and analyzed using a mix of deductive and inductive
strategies. We started by reading and discussing all 40 interviews and identifying
the initial set of codes. This was done by the entire research team of four co-authors.
As the analysis was conducted using the initial set of codes, additional codes and
sub-codes were added to reflect any emergent themes within the preliminary codes.
The identification and interpretation of the key themes is grounded heavily in the
interview data, and less so in the past literature. In the presentation of findings, we
describe the main themes using quotes and summary statements. When
appropriate, we also semi-quantify these themes by reporting their prevalence.
FINDINGS
The patterns that emerge from our data are organized by key aspects of
implementation and collaboration described in the framework above. We begin
with the policy context – in particular, the roles of politics and resources. We then
turn to the role of structure including the types of contracting and oversight regimes
we encountered in our sample. This is followed by the patterns related to the goals
– particularly, goal congruence and goal complexity – which are fundamental
drivers of network collaboration. Next, we assess for the presence of elements of
collaborative effectiveness - network activation, mobilization, and coordination (as
emphasized by Agranoff and McGuire (2001)) and the leveraging of community
capacity and pre-existing relationships to create new social capital (Bryson et al.,
2006) that adds value to implementation efforts. Essential to enhanced capacity
and social capital are the roles of trust and commitment in fostering the joint efforts
that emerged in our data.
Policy Context
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Policy context often holds the key to the challenges and successes of
implementation. Contextual policy and political factors associated with
implementation of the ACA were referred to in the majority of our interviews (n=28
or 72%). Several strong themes emerged in the interview data. First, positive
political support for the program from state and local politicians was highlighted as
a notable aid in outreach and enrollment work. As one respondent remarked, “the
majority of legislators [in the state] were very supportive, and I used that as leverage
because constituents wanted to see them, they wanted to see constituents, so I used
that as an opportunity to increase enrollment efforts” (CT7). As a corollary
proposition, one respondent described how her agency was particularly sensitive to
responding to requests from politicians to address problems their constituents were
experiencing. In her words, these individuals “shoot their way to the top of the list
of our people to help” (MD4).
At the same time, contested politics was also a common theme, even though
all of the states in our sample opted both to expand Medicaid and implement their
own exchanges. Political friction occurred at both the state and local level. As one
interviewee described her experience working with state legislators,
“I had legislators telling me “Why is [your organization] going to lift a finger to prop
up this failed law?”. And we were in a very difficult spot, because the law is the law,
and we are a not-for-profit organization with a mission that is making a healthy
difference for our members…Every step along the way – and I don’t want to paint a
broad brush, it wasn’t just all Republicans – there was a big group that was
committed to undermining the law, and we were caught in the middle of that. And
so were many, many people across the state … and the country. So that was a really
big deal here, just as it was nationally” (MN7).

In Kentucky, a conscious effort was made to mask the association between
the state exchange and the ACA in marketing, outreach and enrollment activities,
given the broad unpopularity of Obamacare in that state. This strategy proved
successful in generating support for the Kentucky program, albeit not without
consequences. As one respondent observed,
“…the fact that we did such a good job of branding our work as being entirely a
Kentucky program and really disconnecting it from the Affordable Care Act, I
wonder if that has had negative consequences that we wouldn’t have expected
because people don’t associate it with the Affordable Care Act” (KY5).”

Political contention at the local/county level surfaced as an important factor
driving the level of effort and resources expended on ACA navigation and outreach
services. This phenomenon was reflected in county variations in the “willingness
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to invest, to put resources into writing a grant, and having an assistance site there,
partnering with local community partners, education people about the ACA”
(CO8).
In addition to politics, resource adequacy emerged as an important element
of the policy context in 32 (82%) of our interviews. While some respondents
considered outreach and enrollment service funding to be adequate, others averred
that the demand for services far exceeded the supply, and that more could have been
achieved with additional funding. As a corollary to this view, the inadequacy of
reimbursement for groups assisting people with enrollment was stressed repeatedly:
“So $6,000 [award amount] didn’t even begin to cover the number of hours that the
individual assister spent conducting outreach in the field, the number of what
marketing would call encounters that … took place to complete the enrollment
process. So, assister organizations were exhausted, they were frustrated. They were
nevertheless committed. We had no assister organization pull out of their contract
for that reason. But nearly every report at the end of the enrollment period indicated
that this was not enough money” (CT6).

The uneven distribution of resources between the Qualified Health Plan
(QHP) program and Medicaid was an important factor as well. In Minnesota the
difference in the reimbursement fee paid for assistance with enrollment in Medicaid
($25) versus a QHP ($70) was widely criticized as being unfair, especially in light
of the fact that many people in hard-to-reach communities, requiring intensive
assistance, “qualify for Medicaid and when they qualify for Medicaid, we get
reimbursed only $25 per person for application” (MN4).
Notably, most respondents perceived navigation and outreach not as a oneoff event but as a continuous effort. As the initial federal grants expired and the
funds available to exchanges for navigation and outreach activities sharply
declined, services and capacity had to be scaled back despite the continuing need
for them. In response to the declining navigation and outreach funding, exchanges
have focused resources on bolstering technological tools and investing in the
capabilities of their call centers, and moved away from funding community-based
activities. This reliance on technology and shift toward more centralized
management of navigation and outreach was decried by some as ill advised:
“I think [the exchange] was really working hard to make a case as to why in-person
assisters are not needed because they had the storefronts and they had the call center,
right, and people can also go online and yes the bulk of the enrolment did happen
through the call center. But that’s from people who are, our enrolments were very
different because we were reaching population that [are] just very hard to reach
groups. The Vietnamese people; we had Laotian; we had the Arabic community; the
Arabic speaking community. Those are groups that didn’t, weren’t trying to go to
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the call center. After, they closed the doors on the program, because the federal
money was not available” (CT5).

In the face of uncertain funding for navigation and outreach among
grantees, the difficulty of managing organizational budgets and retaining staff
emerged as a key concern. Due to gaps between contracts, the contract process with
the exchange was potentially problematic, resulting in weeks in which “you have
nothing to do with your staff” and “you can’t tell them, ‘Okay, you have to go home
for the next 2-3 weeks until the next time starts’” (MN4).
The ACA policy context was therefore shaped by high levels of uncertainty.
Over time, however, the nature of uncertainty has shifted. When discussing the
initial enrollment, respondents cited the shifting regulatory and rule-making
processes within very narrow time frames as major sources of uncertainty.
Following the expiration of federal startup grants for navigation services after the
second enrollment period, uncertainty over the levels of funding – and their impact
on the scope and quality of navigation and outreach services – became significant
sources of concern. Finally, as the November 2016 general election drew nearer,
interviewees reflected on the macro level concerns – specifically, the uncertain
viability of the ACA, given one candidate’s pledge to abolish it. More uncertainty
was generated by the decisions of many major insurance carriers, across multiple
markets, to exit the ACA marketplace for individual insurance.
To summarize, the patterns we find in our data suggest commonality across
these states with regard to high levels of political uncertainty and its potential
impact on resource adequacy. Uncertainty aside, political support seemed to be
highest in Connecticut and New York – two states that performed well in terms of
take-up of their eligible populations.
We observed that respondents were proactive in framing the policy and its
implementation in ways that minimized political conflict and appealed to
individuals across party lines. In short, variations on policy dimensions across the
state were real but somewhat muted. The policy context appears to be only
moderately related to the variation in states’ goal achievement with regard to
enrolling eligible individuals.
Structural Aspects of Collaborative Activity
A key line of inquiry for this study is to better understand the formal and informal
inter-organizational arrangements in public-private navigation and enrollment
efforts. Nearly all respondents (37 or 95%) delved into specific aspects of the
collaborative structures supporting ACA navigation and enrollment. Perhaps the
most salient characteristic common to all the states in our study was one that
commonly trips up implementation: structural complexity. Respondents often
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mentioned the number and breadth of entities participating in the states’
implementation networks. In addition to central marketplace exchange staff,
network actors included state Medicaid agencies, county Medicaid agencies, local
public health departments, insurance brokers and agents, community-based
organizations, foundations, and private firms providing call center, marketing,
advertising, and program management services.
Not surprisingly, given the multiplicity of actors, network coordination
presented a major implementation challenge. In particular, the first open enrollment
period was characterized by struggles identifying “who should be doing what and
how” and what organization “was appropriate to go to for help” (CO7). The actors
within each state were actively engaging in the activities emphasized by Agranoff
and McGuire (2001) in their studies of networks: framing (creating operative
rules), mobilizing (motivating), and synthesizing (coordinating). The structures of
the state implementation systems consisted of both formal contracts and informal
relationships among organizations charged with outreach and assistance to
individuals eligible to enroll in insurance coverage.
A common strategy involved creating some level of network management
through designation of the state ACA exchange to function as a coordinating
organization. Under this scenario, the state’s exchange would funnel resources,
through grants and contracts, to organizations in the community to provide
navigation and outreach service. This structure resembles the “lead organization”
strategy evaluated as particularly successful in Provan and Milward's (1995) study
of effective community mental health networks. The provision of services on the
ground was sometimes managed at the regional level, through intermediary
umbrella organizations that were awarded grants by the exchange, based on a
formal RFP. As described by one exchange official:
“One of the central criteria on … selecting which entities would be given these grants
awards to be the umbrella organizations in each region of the state was the extent to
which they could show that they had partnerships and relationships with other
smaller community-based organizations within their region that were targeted, more
targeted even for certain populations that we are trying to reach.
So, I think that, for the most part, that the theory behind that has played out
successfully, you know, we really have benefited from the local connections that
Connector entities have and their knowledge of their regions that, you know, they
have a familiarity with people and their relationship and they have a relationship that
we wouldn’t have been able to have on our level.” (MD1)

Thus, selection criteria incorporated leveraging of pre-existing relationships
to build capacity and minimize transaction costs, consistent with strategies for
collaborative effectiveness (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone, 2006). In addition to
managing navigation services for a specific region or target population, grantees
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were essential sources of expertise and technical knowledge. In the words of one
exchange staff member, “[t]he function and the role of the navigators were to
provide mentoring, technical assistance, organizing strategy to help assister
organizations overcome barriers, as well as conduct individual enrollments” (CT6).
In general, respondents viewed decentralized structural features and
delegation of day-to-day operational management to regional grantees as a source
of strength, though not without pitfalls, as one interviewee noted:
“…It's great that they’ve contracted these local agencies and we can really be
connected with the folks in the communities. But I think, it does occasionally make
for a situation where [the exchange] is disconnected from a consumer or a consumer
experience in ways that we try really hard to make sure they can hear, but we
occasionally experience disconnect” (MN5).

Similarly, as described by another respondent, the network configuration
requires
“… communication in every direction – up, down, sideways, backwards and inside
out. If a policy gets made at the board level that impacts the consumer assistance
and the connector entity, that may go to the staff person at the exchange, who is
tasked with communicating that, and it may go then to the head of the connector
entity. But those connector entities…are made of not just one organization but then
they fan out into smaller community based organizations around every county. So,
that policy piece may go to the staff person, but it doesn’t get down in a way that is
really reusable to the folks that are working on the ground” (MD 7).

In other words, the coordination, or synthesizing function (Agranoff &
McGuire, 2001) was somewhat undercut by a common challenge in collaborations
– effective information sharing and related transaction costs. We note, however,
that despite these issues, respondents were mostly supportive of states’
decentralized implementation strategies.
In terms of incentives, grantees and contractors typically had specific
enrollment and outreach performance targets written into their agreements, but in
most cases, these were not linked to specific bonuses or penalties, nor were the
targets differentiated by type of plan eligibility (i.e., QHP vs. Medicaid). One
exception was described by an interviewee from Kentucky:
“they [the contractors] don’t get paid by the application, because a big part of their
job is education, but they have a range of goals to meet in terms of how they’re
doing. Then, there is a 10% bonus, and a 10% penalty if they’re not within what
their numbers should be. Then we had, there were a lot of specifics in there in terms
of what they’re supposed to do, and how they’re supposed to do it, and then how
they’re supposed to write a report back to us. For example, if they go to a fair and

https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/vol26/iss2/8

16

Hatch et al.: Implementing ACA Outreach & Enrollment Contracts

festival, they need to send us a picture of what their booth looked like or what it is
that they did. We didn’t want them to be saying you know we were at the Johnson
County Fair, and then it was like one person was there handing out flyers versus
you know what we were expecting which is that they would have a table and give
out materials” (KY4).

Kentucky, therefore, used performance-based contracting strategies to
enhance accountability, incorporating rewards and sanctions, but also monitored
closely by requiring verification of required outreach and enrollment activities.
Overall, formal oversight and accountability was vested in part through
exchange (lead organization) reviews and re-tendering of navigator grants and
contracts. Some states (such as Minnesota) opted to do this on a yearly basis, while
other states awarded grants for 2 or 3-year periods. Monthly reporting to the
exchange was a common oversight mechanism mentioned in our interviews. One
respondent from Connecticut described a strategy that combined a formal financial
component with an informal moral suasion element:
“So, anyway, I think for some people they just thought I’ll take this money and
nobody will ever know that I’m not doing anything. But we were very serious, and
we would say things to people who weren’t doing anything like, you are stealing
money from poor people. It’s hard to answer that. Don’t give me that, get your work
done. Because we could have given the contract to someone else, and there are
people without health insurance, let’s get real about this. We found that most people
really wanted to do it, they just were stuck, and we helped them get unstuck, and
some people just didn’t want to do anything and they didn’t do anything. We stood
on our heads and we did as much as we, could but somebody doesn’t want to do
anything. So, we held back $1,000 of their contract and we didn’t pay the last
thousand. So, we paid them $5,000 and we held back $1,000. So, some people didn’t
get the last thousand, and they were sort of mad but, you know, it’s life. But we were
very closed on it, and we published the report on who did finish the work and who
didn’t.” (CT3)

This strategy tapped into common network organizations’ goals as incentives,
thereby reducing transaction and oversight costs, but when unsuccessful, resorted
to the more traditional (and decidedly less collaborative) formal, transaction-based
contracting techniques, including the imposition of penalties and the invocation of
reputational threats.
Thus, the structures of these implementation systems, for the most part,
were similar across states with regard to their high structural complexity, strongly
decentralized approaches, and adoption of a lead organization model (Provan &
Milward, 1995). Contracting was widely used, and included performance targets,
but only two states – Kentucky and Connecticut – reported adopting binding
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contractor performance rewards or penalties; each did especially well in terms of
meeting enrollment expectations.
Goal Simplicity and Clarity
With a new major policy introduced and multiple actors playing a wide range of
roles, perceptions of policy goals are important to understanding the strategies and
outcomes. Respondents referred to goals in 18 (46%) of the interviews. Reduction
in the number of uninsured persons – an easily measurable policy achievement was the most salient goal articulated by many respondents. Several respondents
went deeper, citing the issues of affordability, another central goal of the ACA, as
a constraint on reducing the number of uninsured or even retaining current
insurance enrollees. A core challenge was described by one respondent:
“… how do we figure out the system that gets at reducing the people who don’t have
health insurance, which is exactly what we are doing now, but also offers options
that are affordable to people? I think that’s always going to be the challenge, and
moving forward if there’s a way we could figure out the system where people can
go on, like they can right now on MNsure, search through these different health plans
and say, “Okay, this works really well for me I’m going to buy this one,” and they
do, and then the following year [the cost] doesn’t go up by 100% premium.” (MN4).

Further, a need to address the remaining disparities in insurance coverage and
access to care, based on racial, ethnic, cultural and language barriers, was cited as
an issue in multiple interviews. A Minnesota official suggested that the incentive
structure for navigators be modified to address this:
“... there was a big push to make this navigator program work for populations that
are not entering through the traditional ways. You have to make sure you are
reaching our populations of color, our native populations. And all of these
populations continue to show the greatest disparities, whether they are insured or
not. There wasn’t … there was not a lot (in the first year) of thought given to who
and what organizations serve which populations, and do we have enough to serve,
are we making a dent, are we making sure they are well trained to reach populations.
So, I don’t think there was enough thought to that. I also don’t think there was
enough thought given to how to alter the payment structure to reach those
populations… I think that navigators needed to be rewarded in a different way to
make sure they were reaching those populations of color. They should have had a
different pay structure for reaching the populations that we said were important for
us to reach” (MN8).

Our respondents also frequently referred to the goal of educating people on
being smart consumers of health insurance beyond simply enrolling in coverage.
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The importance of health insurance literacy was emphasized as a critical element
of retention and successful transition between different types of insurance coverage
(e.g., moving from Medicaid to QHP or employer-sponsored plan):
“So, we’ve got folks who have received coverage for the first time through Medicaid
under the expansion and now … perhaps they are able to purchase private health
insurance. They’ve got another paying job, they got an extra shift, that sort of thing,
and making sure that folks know how to navigate health insurance, which we all
know is not easy, no matter what your education level is…We’re really trying to
focus on how can we … at a Medicaid level, help them understand how to navigate
health insurance and what the value of insurance is, so that when they do go up and
off Medicaid into private insurance, they’re better consumers of health insurance in
general. That is something we see as a challenge” (CO7).

Importantly, trust, commitment, and shared norms, interacting with goal
agreement, appear to be central to the implementation of ACA across the sampled
states, as reported in 11 (28%) interviews. Our respondents identified a range of
factors positively contributing to the development of trust. These included
operational and stakeholder transparency, cooperation between navigator
organizations to balance workloads, exchange efforts to foster a sense of
connectedness among navigator organizations, and the positive experiences borne
of navigator-broker cooperation.
On the negative side, the partisan political divide over the ACA and an
initial lack of commitment to sharing information and coordinating activities with
Medicaid agencies by state exchanges were cited as impediments to the
development of trust. One commonly noted drawback of the configuration of
navigation and outreach services was the limitation of navigators to online access
of applications initiated by consumers. The conflict between the twin goals of
ensuring privacy protections of consumers and enabling access to enrollment
services through multiple venues emerged as a common theme. Another example
of goal conflict surfaced in the prohibition against navigators offering advice on
plan selection, based on the circumstances of the applicant. Although this
restriction is in the statute to obviate the possibility of coercion on the part of
navigators, it limits their ability to provide guidance, which many applicants deem
desirable.
Overall, we observed a substantial amount of congruence in the goals
discussed the by many stakeholders that we interviewed, despite varying levels of
goal conflict that surfaced during the ACA implementation. Most respondents
conceptualized their goals primarily in terms of higher enrollments, with the
caveats of ensuring affordability and informed decision-making. With regards to
the central focus of the ACA, we observed no substantial or systematic evidence of
perceived or reported goal ambiguity or any notable divergence of goals across
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multiple parties. This, among many other factors, may have shaped the
implementation of the law in these states.
Evidence of Successful Collaboration
Having just gone through the process of implementing a major new law, 18 (46%)
of our respondents explicitly referred to various elements essential to effective
network collaboration as highlighted in prior research. These include establishing
processes and mechanisms for framing rules, mobilizing toward a common
objective, and synthesizing with coordination and shared goals (Agranoff &
McGuire, 2001). Several respondents commented on the importance of broadbased stakeholder meetings in building support for the exchanges in general, and
navigation and outreach in particular. As described by one interviewee, the effort
“was very much a broad-based partnership in terms of planning and building how
this… how Colorado’s exchange was actually implemented. It really was designed
to be a very Colorado-specific effort. And so, that what we created was designed to
really reflect what the stakeholders wanted and the uniqueness of the state. And, I
really think that that was something that we did very well and that that was reflected
also in how the navigator program and the outreach work was established, as well as
many of the different operational details of the exchange” (CO5).

Catalysts for the mobilization of organizational and other resources
sometimes derived from opportunities – for example, filling a void in the
stewardship of a state IT system instrumental to the implementation of the ACA –
and from cross-cutting affiliations of the key actors. One example of the latter is a
Medicaid agency that was able to leverage the executive director’s profession as a
nurse to mobilize “a whole network of nurses who are out in the community, not
just the office… They helped us get the word out. And we gave them tools to do
that” (CO7). Similarly, exchange board ties to key state entities – for example, the
director of the state agency overseeing Medicaid – were also cited as helping to
secure “strong partnerships with those agencies” that “were already heavily
involved in health care, health eligibility, health insurance, health programs, and
health access” (MD6).
Another collaborative strategy described by respondents was to tap into the
knowledge and expertise of individuals conducting navigation and outreach in
order to support the efforts of those who were new to the venture or who were
experiencing problems. This type of assistance came in two basic forms: in-person
support and technological/communication tools. An example of the former is
described by one respondent from Connecticut:

https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/vol26/iss2/8

20

Hatch et al.: Implementing ACA Outreach & Enrollment Contracts

So, one of the biggest things that we did was we got the assisters together in little
clusters and we started having them come, we facilitated meetings, monthly meetings
where we talked about strategies, we talked about the cases, things like elevator
pitches, how to do it, how to get out there, how to touch the people that you need to
touch because you couldn’t really be passive if you’re doing outreach…Then the
navigators worked with the assisters and they started planning community enrolment
affairs. So, they would … have a fair at the public library in New Haven. They would
have one in this housing development that was different. For example, the housing
development one needed more Spanish speaking assisters, and so we started to
coordinate their efforts” (CT5).

An example of an enabling technological communication tool was the
Assistor Resource Center (ARC), a website for navigators and certified application
counselors in Minnesota to share information, with a dedicated support staff to
assist in troubleshooting enrollment problems. This is supplemented by a monthly
call for navigators, coordinated by the exchange, to disseminate information and
“hear from navigators, hear about what’s working, what the struggles are” (MN5).
Leveraging community capacity by partnering with the existing
community networks was stressed by respondents in 25 (64%) of interviews as an
essential component to the success of getting individuals enrolled in health
insurance:
“What happened was, it appears to me that there were these very large networks of
organizations that … pre-existed the ACA or kind of advocacy groups for coverage.
We’ve done some coverage and we’ve done some coverage expansion. So, there
were some groups that I think had already formed themselves and mobilized to try
and move those earlier efforts forward... Once the ACA passed and all these funds
started coming in to the state, they essentially re-mobilized the networks that were
already in place” (CO2)

Some respondents described the state environment as being supportive of
nonprofits in general, with an established pattern of collaboration where people are
“very open to getting themselves to work on coalitions and work together and be
constructive” (MN3). Among the types of networks accessed, pre-existing
Medicaid assistance networks were referenced by several respondents as an
important resource, given their prior experience enrolling low income populations
in health insurance programs. Advocacy networks were also cited as key players in
shaping the delivery of navigation and outreach services. In a similar vein, many
respondents remarked upon the importance of connecting with existing
community-based organizations working with specific populations that were likely
to qualify for Medicaid or ACPTS, such as immigrants. Community institutions
were also noted as key conduits for outreach, “particularly if their missions had
some type of social justice component to it” (MD3).
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Many of these pre-existing networks relied on connections with public
health departments, local libraries, churches, and small businesses. They formed
ties with community leaders, elected officials, and citizen groups. And, they
embraced locations in which potentially eligible individuals were comfortable, and
where trust had already been established through community practices directed at
reducing health disparities – locations such as barbershops and spas, where research
has demonstrated success in public health outreach (Browne et al., 2006). A
prominent example is the Black Barbershop Health Outreach Program, which has
focused on “efforts in places outside of traditional clinical and community settings
such as the barbershop has shown promise for ameliorating [health] disparities” for
diseases such as colon cancer and hypertension (Releford et al., 2010; p.185).6
Similarly, “beauty salons represent a promising setting for maximizing reach,
reinforcement, and the impact of public health interventions aimed at addressing
health disparities among African American women” (Linnan & Ferguson, 2007).
In addition to tapping into existing community networks and resources,
states worked to cultivate and develop new sources of community capacity. One
interviewee described a concerted strategy to identify key individuals, known to
community members, to help create micro-groups to get different groups “to work
together who had never worked together before,” with the aim of customizing
outreach (CT3). Another respondent described how the exchange targeted
community leaders, including elected officials, “who represented hundreds if not
thousands of people within their community,” and “trained them on what the ACA
is … and how they can help spread the word” (CT4).
Although public and nonprofit organizations were more likely to be
leveraged in navigation and outreach, private-sector resources were also
instrumental to the effort. Brokers and insurance agents were the most common
sources of private sector participation with ACA navigation and outreach. An
example of cooperation between brokers and navigators is the Minnesota Preferred
Broker Program, in which navigators co-locate in a broker’s office during open
enrollment. In the words of one respondent, this approach fuses different areas of
expertise in a single location, since “brokers don’t necessarily want to deal with
Medicaid and navigators don’t necessarily know how to answer some of the
questions that come up in a QHP application” (MN1). Local businesses were also
recruited to disseminate enrollment information directly to workers, particularly
among employers who hired part-time staff, such as the barbershops and spas
referenced above, as well as fast food establishments and small retailers.
Most of these states’ network groups were committed to the outreach
enterprise in part because they shared a common ACA goal – to increase health
6

The Black Barbershop Health Outreach Program has been used successfully to reach thousands
of African-American men through community-based health screening and other preventive
programs (Releford et al., 2010).
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insurance coverage. The community-based strategy helped to simplify a highly
complex implementation task. While elongated chains of accountability can
impede implementation, in this case, the combination of pre-existing relationships,
which helped to build or solidify trust, combined with common goals and extensive
capacity to reach into communities, mitigated transaction costs and fostered
implementation.
In essence, the framing, mobilizing, and synthesizing efforts we observed
capitalized on established personal and inter-organizational relationships, as well
as professional ties. These efforts tapped into the existing expertise of local
communities and relied on community-based and online vehicles to bring people
together to inform, strategize, exchange information, and motivate the potential
collaborators. These efforts may have helped build extra support for the policy,
identify additional partners, and reduce informational asymmetries that may have
affected the next stages of implementation. In addition, these strategies achieved
the first, second, and third-order effects referenced by Bryson, Crosby, and Stone
(2006) as necessary for effective collaboration, generating social capital, service
adaptation, and joint action and learning. The synergistic elements of these
collaborative efforts appear to have generated added value – delivering, as networks
of organizations and individuals, service levels and quality beyond what could have
otherwise materialized.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Much of the prior discussion about the implementation of the ACA has focused on
the failures related to information technology. While the marketplace is an
important component of the law, a broader discussion of implementation –
particularly of outreach and enrollment services – can add to our understanding of
how the law has been executed and how similar laws may be best executed in the
future. Much can be learned from the work of dozens of agencies, hundreds of
organizations, and thousands of individuals involved in the implementation effort.
This paper attempts to shed light on this central part of ACA implementation by
examining partnerships that may have facilitated increased rates insured
populations in a sample of six states.
In this sample of states, the implementation challenges were more or less
commonly shared: complexity of the intergovernmental and inter-sectoral
structures, organizations, and actors; resource constraints; political and policy
uncertainty; and the use of market mechanisms – contracts and their attendant
accountability challenges, all increased the potential for serious impediments to
executing the law. But, perhaps most importantly, in all states under consideration,
we observed elements of collaboration effectiveness stressed in the prevailing
theories. The states in our sample were able to use contracts to create extensive
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community-based networks that were central to their implementation efforts. These
collaborative systems were built on pre-existing relationships. They reached deep
into communities, aligned goals so that the simplicity of purpose trumped
complexity, and achieved collective synergies that generated social capital,
adaptation, joint learning, and new capacities. The activation, mobilization,
synthesis, and coordination elements needed for effective collaboration emerged as
strong themes in our data (Agranoff &McGuire, 2001), as well as the added value
needed to achieve what would not have been achieved without the network (Bryson,
Crosby & Stone, 2006). Trust, commitment, shared norms helped the states move
toward the common goal of increasing insurance coverage and reduce the fallout
from unavoidable sub-goal conflicts.
While federal resources were instrumental to states’ implementation efforts,
the uncertainty of future funding pushed the implementers to search for solutions
and to innovate. We observed successful efforts to build on existing local expertise
and capacity, capitalizing on the strengths of local organizations and actors. When
needed, states also pursued their own technological solutions. Finally, we saw
evidence of adaptation and learning among key participants in implementation.
The six states varied in their performance as measured by “taking up”
eligible enrollees. We speculate that the effectiveness of the first market exchange
launches may be important in explaining take-up in these states. Exchange
governance structures and the legal mechanisms that established them appear to be
less useful in explaining the variation in take-up. With this analysis of interview
data, we suggest that two states with particularly successful and deep community
ties embedded into their implementation systems – Kentucky and Maryland - were
able to achieve levels of take-up consistent with Connecticut – the state that led the
pack in terms of exchange launch success.
These findings suggest that the implementation of social programs could in
the future be facilitated by adopting simple but explicitly decentralized, goalfocused strategies that draw on established local networks of expertise and
commitment, and that the use those networks and their individual members,
especially those who are trusted in their communities, to break down barriers to
program participation among targeted populations. Despite the common
implementation problems related to structural complexity, political uncertainty, and
resource concerns, what we observed in these admittedly policy-supportive states
indicates that emphasizing collaborative strategies, and mobilizing community
resources and organizations with the closest ties to the targeted enrollees, can
mitigate implementation obstacles. The states that emerged as most successful on
these and other collaborative dimensions also enrolled comparatively high
percentages of their ACA-eligible populations.
Our findings are tempered by the limitations of our snowball sample
strategy within the six states. Interviewees were not randomly selected from the
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complete pool of actors involved in their states’ implementation of the ACA;
therefore, selection bias is a concern. Generalizability is also an issue, though
limiting the sample to the states that implemented health exchanges provides for
more depth and greater comparability in identifying sources of variation in our
findings (Yin, 2014). Our conclusions are meant to be suggestive and not
conclusive. The next steps in this research should build on this work by formally
identifying and testing hypotheses, especially as related to collaborative networks,
across a wider range of states and/or local settings. Furthermore, new data on the
post-2016 years is needed that can shed light on the extent to which the early
successes in these states were sustained (or not). Despite the limitations of this
research, it contributes to our understanding of the underlying dynamics associated
with the implementation of the ACA. It provides insight into how states developed
complex outreach and enrollment systems that performed well despite of a wide
range of contextual challenges.
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Table 1. Characteristics of Exchanges
State

Name

Creation
Date

Mechanism

Governance Exchange
Structure
Launch

Uninsured Rate

Take-Up Enrollment
Rate*
Success**

2013 2014 2015
Connect for 07/2011
Legislation
Quasi-govt. Problematic
Care
14% 13% 10% 22%
Below
Colorado
CT
Access
08/2011
Legislation
Quasi-govt. Excellent
12% 8% 7% 35%
Above
Health CT
KY
Kentucky
08/2012
Executive
Within State Very Good
Health
Order
Agency
16% 8% 7% 30%
Above
Benefit
Exchange
MD
Maryland
03/2011
Legislation
Quasi-govt. Problematic
Health
13% 6% 7% 34%
Above
Benefit
Exchange
MN
MNSure
03/2013
Legislation
Quasi-govt. Problematic 8%
8% 7% 22%
Below
NY
New York 04/2012
Executive
Within State Very Good
Health
Order
Agency
11% 9% 8% 22%
Above
Benefit
Exchange
* This information is valid as of March 2016. Data include individuals who have enrolled in a Marketplace plan, have paid their first month's premium
("effectuated" enrollment), and *who have an active policy. The take-up rate is calculated based on potential marketplace enrollees; this includes all
individuals eligible for tax credits as well as other legally-residing individuals who are uninsured or purchase non-group coverage, have incomes above
Medicaid/CHIP eligibility levels, and who do not have access to employer-sponsored coverage. The estimate excludes uninsured individuals with
incomes below the poverty level who live in states that elected not to expand the Medicaid program. These individuals are not eligible for financial
assistance and are unlikely to have the resources to purchase coverage in the Marketplace.
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation. (2015). Marketplace Enrollment as a Share of the Potential Marketplace Population Kaiser Family Foundation.
Retrieved November 8, 2017, from https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/marketplace-enrollment-as-a-share-of-the-potential-marketplacepopulation-2015/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D
**Compared to Urban Institute’s Enrollment Projections as of 2015 (Holahan et al., 2015)
CO
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Table 2. The Details of State Implementation Structures
Implementation Structure Details
COLORADO. Colorado’s market exchange was established by state law in 2011.78 Although created as
quasigovernmental agency, the exchange was registered as an independent nonprofit entity in March 2012. Connect
for Health Colorado is governed by a Board of Directors appointed by the governor and the state majority and
minority leaders in the Colorado legislature. Navigation and outreach services are outsourced to a variety of
organizations in the community. The constellation of organizations connected to this effort are commonly referred
to as the ‘assistance network’ while navigators are known as ‘health coverage guides’. Colorado’s marketplace
exchange launch was complicated by issues related to its use of funds
CONNECTICUT. In 2011, Connecticut adopted legislation authorizing the creation of market exchange. Known
as Access Health CT, Connecticut’s exchange functions as a quasi-governmental entity. Its governance structure
consists of a 14-member governing board, headed by the lieutenant governor. The board members are selected
according to their positions in state government, including the commissioner of social services, secretary of policy
and management, and the state healthcare advocate, or are appointed by elected officials (specifically, the governor,
and the majority and minority leaders of the Connecticut House and Senate). Connecticut’s exchange code has been
viewed as a model and acquired by other states with failed launches, including Maryland.
KENTUCKY. In 2012, Governor Steven L. Beshear (D) issued Executive Order 587 establishing the Kentucky
Health Benefit Exchange (KHBE) within the Cabinet for Health and Family Services. In 2013, the state announced
that its online Marketplace would be called Kynect. Navigators and in-person assisters are known as “Kynectors.”
Kentucky’s exchange launch has been associated with few concerns, and its success has been attributed in part to its
simplicity. Following the 2015 election of Republican Governor Matt Bevin, whose election campaign platform
included promises to dismantle Kynect and the state’s Medicaid expansion, the future of the state exchange is
unclear.
MARYLAND. In 2011, Governor Martin O’Malley (D) signed SB 182/HB 166 into law establishing the Maryland
Health Benefit Exchange (MBHE). In August 2012, the state announced that the name for the new insurance
Marketplace would be Maryland Health Connection. The law defines the MBHE as a quasi-governmental
organization, specifically, a “public corporation and independent unit of state government.” The MHBE is governed
by a nine-member board, including the Executive Director of Maryland’s Health Care Commission as the Chair,
Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene, Commissioner of Insurance, and six members appointed by the Governor
7

The other seven state-based exchanges are in California, District of Columbia, Idaho, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Washington.
8
The name of the exchange was changed from Colorado Health Benefit Exchange to Connect for Health Colorado in March 2013.
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and with consent from the Senate. Maryland’s exchange launch was associated with highly visible problems for the
consumers, similar in many ways the issues of the federal exchange, in part due to its ambitious plan to integrate
ACA and Medicaid data systems.
MINNESOTA. Minnesota’s market exchange, MNSure, was created through legislation passed in 2013. MNSure
is a state entity governed by a Board of Directors appointed by the governor and confirmed by the Minnesota House
and Senate. Members serve four-year terms and the composition of the board is subject to requirements related to
geographical and area-of-expertise representation. Minnesota’s exchange launch encountered problems early on.
NEW YORK. The New York Health Benefit Exchange (NYHBE) was created by Executive Order within the NY
Department of Health. The Exchange was given the authority to work in conjunction with the Department of
Financial Services and other agencies to carry out the requirements of the ACA. Although the Executive Order did
not create an independent governing board for the exchange, it established regional advisory committees, consisting
of consumer advocates, small business representatives, health care providers, agents, brokers, insurers, labor
organizations, and other stakeholders, to advise and provide recommendations on Exchange operations. Over 180
members were appointed to five regional advisory committees. New York’s exchange launch has been seen as quite
successful.
Sources for Tables 1 and 2: Kaiser Family Foundation reports (the rates of uninsured retrieved from http://kaiserf.am/2eNPk54; Rockerfeller
Institute of Government, ACA Implementation Research Network reports
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Table 3. Interview Respondent by Organization Type
State agency

Contractor

Other*

Colorado

4

4

0

Totals
state
8

Connecticut

4

3

1

8

Kentucky

1

3

1

5

Maryland

3

3

1

7

Minnesota

2

6

1

9

New York**

0

2

1

3

Totals by type

14

21

5

40

by

*Other" includes advocacy organizations and academic researchers who authored
Rockefeller Center-sponsored studies of states' ACA implementation approaches
**New York's low response rate owes to a rule placed on contractors by the state that
restricts them from speaking to external entities regarding their work for the exchange.
Repeated attempts to interview respondents from contracting organizations and state
agencies, including the exchange, were unsuccessful. Our findings section includes
observations from New York respondents when possible.

References
Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2001). Big Questions in Public Network
Management Research. Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory, 11(3), 295–326. http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a003504
Agranoff, R., & Radin, B. A. 1. . (1991): 203-231. (1991). The comparative case
study approach in public administration. Research in Public Administration,
1(1), 203–231.
Amirkhanyan, A. (2008). Privatizing Public Nursing Homes: Examining the
Effects on Quality and Access. Public Administration Review, 68(4), 665–680.
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2008.00906.x
Amirkhanyan, A. A. (2009). Collaborative Performance Measurement: Examining
and Explaining the Prevalence of Collaboration in State and Local
Government Contracts. Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory, 19(3), 523–554. http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mun022
Amirkhanyan, A. A., Kim, H. J., & Lambright, K. T. (2008). Does the public sector
outperform the nonprofit and for-profit sectors? Evidence from a national
panel study on nursing home quality and access. Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management, 27(2), 326–353. http://doi.org/10.1002/pam.20327
Amirkhanyan, A. A., Kim, H. J., & Lambright, K. T. (2012). Closer Than “Arms
Length.” The American Review of Public Administration, 42(3), 341–366.
http://doi.org/10.1177/0275074011402319

Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University, 2019

29

Journal of Public Management & Social Policy, Vol. 26, No. 2 [2019], Art. 8

Amirkhanyan, A. A., Meier, K. J., & O’Toole, L. J. (2017). Managing in the
Regulatory Thicket: Regulation Legitimacy and Expertise. Public
Administration Review, 77(3), 381–394. http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12591
Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2007). Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(4), 543–571.
http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum032
Barzelay, M. (2003). The process dynamics of public management policy change.
International Public Management Journal, 6(3), 251–402. Retrieved from
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/31909/
Brown, T. L., & Potoski, M. (2003). Contract-Management Capacity in Municipal
and County Governments. Public Administration Review, 63(2), 153–164.
http://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6210.00276
Browne, Mario C. and Ford, Angela F. and Thomas, Stephen B. (2006). Take a
Health Professional to the People: A community outreach strategy for
mobilizing African American barber shops and beauty salons as health
promotion sites. Health Education & Behavior, 33 (4). pp. 425-432.
Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Stone, M. M. (2006). The Design and
Implementation of Cross-Sector Collaborations: Propositions from the
Literature.
Public
Administration
Review,
66(s1),
44–55.
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00665.x
Corlette, S., Blumberg, L. J., & Wengle, E. (2014). Insurance Brokers and the ACA:
Early Barriers and Options for Expanding Their Role ACA Implementation—
Monitoring
and
Tracking.
Retrieved
from
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/39571/2000091Insurance-Brokers-and-the-ACA.pdf
DeHoog, R. H. (1981). Political and Economic Approaches to Government
"Contracting Out": A Study Of Human Service Contracting In The State Of
Michigan
(Dissertation)
Retrieved
from
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C48&q=dissertation+
Political+and
+Economic+Approaches+to+Government%22+contracting+Out%22%3A+A
+Study+of+Human+Service+Contracting+in+the+State+of+Michigan&btnG
=
Derthick, M., & Urban Institute. (1972). New towns in-town; why a Federal
program failed. Urban Institute.
Emerson, Kirk, Tina Nabatchi and Stephen Balough. (2012). An Integrative
Framework for Collaborative Governance." Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory, 22(1): 1-29.
Fernandez, S. (2009). Understanding Contracting Performance. Administration &
Society, 41(1), 67–100. http://doi.org/10.1177/0095399708330257

https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/vol26/iss2/8

30

Hatch et al.: Implementing ACA Outreach & Enrollment Contracts

Frederickson, D. G., & Frederickson, H. G. (2006). Measuring the performance of
the hollow state. Georgetown University Press. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2tt38v
Frederickson, H. G., & Stazyk, E. C. (2010). Myths, Markets, and the Visible Hand
of American Bureaucracy. In R. F. Durant (Ed.), Oxford Handbook of
American
Bureaucracy.
Oxford
University
Press.
http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238958.003.0015
Girth, A. M., Hefetz, A., Johnston, J. M., & Warner, M. E. (2012). Outsourcing
Public Service Delivery: Management Responses in Noncompetitive Markets.
Public Administration Review, 72(6), 887–900. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.15406210.2012.02596.x
Guo, C., & Acar, M. (2005). Understanding Collaboration Among Nonprofit
Organizations: Combining Resource Dependency, Institutional, and Network
Perspectives. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 34(3), 340–361.
http://doi.org/10.1177/0899764005275411
Hefetz, A., & Warner, M. (2004). Privatization and Its Reverse: Explaining the
Dynamics of the Government Contracting Process. Journal of Public
Administration
Research
and
Theory,
14(2),
171–190.
http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muh012
Holahan, J., Blumberg, L. J., Wengle, E., Hill, I., Peters, R., & Solleveld, P. (2015).
Factors That Contributed to Low Marketplace Enrollment Rates in Five States
in 2015 ACA Implementation—Monitoring and Tracking. Retrieved from
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/72441/2000488Factors-That-Contributed-To-Low-Marketplace-Enrollment-In-Five-StatesIn-2015.pdf
Isett, K. R., Mergel, I. A., LeRoux, K., Mischen, P. A., & Rethemeyer, R. K. (2011).
Networks in Public Administration Scholarship: Understanding Where We
Are and Where We Need to Go. Journal of Public Administration Research
and
Theory,
21(Supplement
1),
i157–i173.
http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muq061
Johnston, J. M., & Girth, A. M. (2012). Government Contracts and “Managing the
Market.”
Administration
&
Society,
44(1),
3–29.
http://doi.org/10.1177/0095399711417396
Johnston, J. M., & Romzek, B. S. (2008). Social Welfare Contracts as Networks.
Administration
&
Society,
40(2),
115–146.
http://doi.org/10.1177/0095399707312826
Johnston, J., & Romzek, B. (2010). Contracting: Promise, Performance, Perils,
Possibilities. In R. F. Durant (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of American
Bureaucracy. Oxford University Press.

Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University, 2019

31

Journal of Public Management & Social Policy, Vol. 26, No. 2 [2019], Art. 8

Kaiser Family Foundation. (2013). Navigator and In-Person Assistance Programs:
A
Snapshot
of
State
Programs.
Retrieved
from
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/8437.pdf
Kaiser Family Foundation. (2015). Marketplace Enrollment as a Share of the
Potential Marketplace Population Kaiser Family Foundation. Retrieved
November 8, 2017, from https://www.kff.org/health-reform/stateindicator/marketplace-enrollment-as-a-share-of-the-potential-marketplacepopulation2015/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%
22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D
Kaiser Family Foundation, n.d., State Health Facts. http://kff.org/statedata/.
Kelman, S. J. (2002). Contracting. In O. V. Elliott (Ed.), The tools of government:
A guide to the new governance (pp. 282–318). Oxford University Press.
Linnan, Laura A. and Yvonne Owens Ferguson (2007). Beauty Salons: A
Promising Health Promotion Setting for Reaching and Promoting Health
Among African American Women. Health Education & Behavior, 34 (3):
517-530.
Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public
Services.
Matland, R. E. (1995). Synthesizing the Implementation Literature: The
Ambiguity-Conflict Model of Policy Implementation. Journal of Public
Administration
Research
and
Theory,
5(2),
145–174.
http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a037242
May, P. J. (2015). Implementation failures revisited: Policy regime perspectives.
Public
Policy
and
Administration,
30(3–4),
277–299.
http://doi.org/10.1177/0952076714561505
Milward, H. B., & Provan, K. G. (2000). Governing the Hollow State. Journal of
Public Administration Research and Theory, 10(2), 359–380.
http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024273
Milward, H. B., Provan, K. G., Fish, A., Isett, K. R., & Huang, K. (2010).
Governance and Collaboration: An Evolutionary Study of Two Mental Health
Networks. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,
20(Supplement 1), i125–i141. http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mup038
Nathan, Richard P. (2016). Understanding Health Reform Implementation from the
Ground Up. Albany, NY: The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government.
July.
https://rockinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/2016-07Health_Reform_Implementation.pdf
Nathan, R. P., & Gais, T. L. (1998). Early Findings About the Newest New
Federalism for Welfare. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 28(3), 95–103.
http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a029988

https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/vol26/iss2/8

32

Hatch et al.: Implementing ACA Outreach & Enrollment Contracts

O’Leary, R., & Bingham, L. B. (2007). Conclusion: Conflict and Collaboration in
Networks. International Public Management Journal, 10(1), 103–109.
http://doi.org/10.1080/10967490601185799
O’Leary, R., & Vij, N. (2012). Collaborative Public Management. The American
Review
of
Public
Administration,
42(5),
507–522.
http://doi.org/10.1177/0275074012445780
O’Toole, L. J. (1988). Strategies for intergovernmental management:implementing
programs in interorganizational networks. International Journal of Public
Administration, 11(4), 417–441. http://doi.org/10.1080/01900698808524596
O’Toole, L. J. (1989). Goal Multiplicity in the Implementation Setting: Subtle
Impacts and the Case Of Wastewater Treatment Privatization. Policy Studies
Journal, 18(1), 1–20. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1989.tb00596.x
Peterson, P. E., Rabe, B., & Wong, K. (1986). Making Federalism Work.
Pressman, J. L., Wildavsky, A. B., & Oakland Project. (1973). Implementation:
how great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland; or, Why it’s
amazing that Federal programs work at all, this being a saga of the Economic
Development Administration as told by two sympathetic observers who seek
to build morals . University of California Press.
Provan, K. G., & Kenis, P. (2007). Modes of Network Governance: Structure,
Management, and Effectiveness. Journal of Public Administration Research
and Theory, 18(2), 229–252. http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum015
Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. B. (1995). A Preliminary Theory of
Interorganizational Network Effectiveness: A Comparative Study of Four
Community Mental Health Systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(1),
1. http://doi.org/10.2307/2393698
Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. B. (2001). Do Networks Really Work? A Framework
for Evaluating Public-Sector Organizational Networks. Public Administration
Review, 61(4), 414–423. http://doi.org/10.1111/0033-3352.00045
Radin, B. A., & Romzek, B. S. (1996). Accountability Expectations in an
Intergovernmental Arena: The National Rural Development Partnership.
Publius:
The
Journal
of
Federalism,
26(2),
59–81.
http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a029855
Releford, B. J., Frencher, S. K, Jr, & Yancey, A. K. (2010). Health promotion in
barbershops: Balancing outreach and research in African American
communities. Ethnicity and Disease, 20(2), 185–188.
Rigby, Elizabeth. 2012. State Resistance to “ObamaCare.” The Forum: A Journal
of Applied Research in Contemporary Politics. 10,2: Article 5.
Rhodes, M. L., & Murray, J. (2007). Collaborative Decision Making in Urban
Regeneration: A Complex Adaptive Systems Perspective. International
Public
Management
Journal,
10(1),
79–101.
http://doi.org/10.1080/10967490601185740

Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University, 2019

33

Journal of Public Management & Social Policy, Vol. 26, No. 2 [2019], Art. 8

Rockerfeller Institute of Government. (2014). ACA Implementation Research
Network State Reports. Retrieved from http://www.rockinst.org/aca/
Rogers, E., & Weber, E. P. (2010). Thinking Harder About Outcomes for
Collaborative Governance Arrangements. The American Review of Public
Administration, 40(5), 546–567. http://doi.org/10.1177/0275074009359024
Romzek, B., LeRoux, K., Johnston, J., Kempf, R. J., & Piatak, J. S. (2014). Informal
Accountability in Multisector Service Delivery Collaborations. Journal of
Public Administration Research and Theory, 24(4), 813–842.
http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mut027
Romzek, B. S., & Johnston, J. M. (1999). Reforming Medicaid through
Contracting: The Nexus of Implementation and Organizational Culture.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 9(1), 107–140.
http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024402
Romzek, B. S., & Johnston, J. M. (2002). Effective Contract Implementation and
Management: A Preliminary Model. Journal of Public Administration
Research
and
Theory,
12(3),
423–453.
http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a003541
Romzek, B. S., & Johnston, J. M. (2005). State Social Services Contracting:
Exploring the Determinants of Effective Contract Accountability. Public
Administration Review, 65(4), 436–449. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.15406210.2005.00470.x
Romzek, B. S., LeRoux, K., & Blackmar, J. M. (2012). A Preliminary Theory of
Informal Accountability among Network Organizational Actors. Public
Administration Review, 72(3), 442–453. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.15406210.2011.02547.x
Sabatier, P. A., & Mazmanian, D. (1983). Policy Implementation. New York:
Encyclopedia of Policy Sciences. Marcel Dekker.
Sandfort, J. R. (2000). Moving Beyond Discretion and Outcomes: Examining
Public Management from the Front Lines of the Welfare System. Journal of
Public Administration Research and Theory, 10(4), 729–756.
http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024289
Savas, E. S. (2000). Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships. New York:
Seven Bridges Press.
Stoker, R. P. (1991). Reluctant Partners: Implementing Federal Policy - Robert P.
Stoker - Google Books.
Sullivan, S. (2018). Republicans Abandon the Fight to Repeal and Replace
Obama’s Health Care Law. Washington Post. November 7th.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/republicans-abandon-the-fightto-repeal-and-replace-obamas-health-care-law/2018/11/07/157d052c-e2d811e8-ab2c-b31dcd53ca6b_story.html?utm_term=.aa1347fc12edTestimony by

https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/vol26/iss2/8

34

Hatch et al.: Implementing ACA Outreach & Enrollment Contracts

Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, October 30, 2013. (2013).
Thompson, F. J. (2013). Health Reform, Polarization, and Public Administration.
Public
Administration
Review,
73(s1),
S3–S12.
http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12127
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. Health Insurance Coverage:
Early Release of Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey,
January-June
2018.
Released
11/2018.
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur201811.pdf
Van Meter, D. S., & Van Horn, C. E. (1975). The Policy Implementation Process.
Administration
&
Society,
6(4),
445–488.
http://doi.org/10.1177/009539977500600404
Williamson, O. (1999). Public and private bureaucracies: a transaction cost
economics perspectives. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15(1),
306–342. http://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/15.1.306
Yin, R. K. (2014). Case Study Research Design and Methods (5th ed.). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage. 282 pages. Sage. http://doi.org/10.3138/cjpe.30.1.108
Zullo, R. (2007). Transit Contracting Reexamined: Determinants of Cost Efficiency
and Resource Allocation. Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory, 18(3), 495–515. http://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum024
Appendix A. Interview Instrument.
Note to the Interviewer. Read: “Thank you for agreeing to participate in our
study.”
Turn on the voice recorder and identify interview ID and location, e.g., “This is
Washington DC interview number one.”
Begin the interview.
1. I would like to begin by asking about your agency (for nonprofit
respondents, use “organization”). What does your agency (organization)
do? What is its role in the implementation and operation of the ACA?
2. What is your position and your role with respect to the implementation of
the ACA?
3. Please describe your state’s experience with the ACA. We are especially
interested in your view of the strengths and weaknesses of your ACA
navigation and outreach services.
Probe: What makes your state’s experience unique?
4. Can you describe your state’s administrative or management infrastructure
for ACA navigation and outreach?
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a. Has the state conducted (or have plans to conduct) any customer
satisfaction surveys that you are aware of?
5. Some states tend to contract out services and functions associated with
ACA navigation and outreach. Can you tell us about your state’s
contracting related experiences? (ask about design - sole-source,
competitive contracts? Performance based? How many cycles so far?)
a. Follow up for contractor/sub-contractors: How has your experience
as a contractor/subcontractor been?
6. What is your perspective on the adequacy of state fiscal and human
resources for implementation and operation of your state’s navigation and
outreach services?
7. To what extent has state or local politics play a role in implementation?
8. What do you think your state did and/or does particularly well?
Probe: Are there “best practices” that could be shared with other
states?
Probe: What resources or support have been important in the
implementation of the Affordable Care Act?
Probe: What are some of the key lessons you have learned from
your state’s experience?
9. What have been the biggest challenges in implementing the ACA in your
state?
Probe: How were these challenges addressed?
10. Are you aware of any documentation or data collected on your state’s ACA
navigation and outreach contracts? Sub-contracts?
11. In your opinion, as of today, how would you evaluate the quality of the
ACA navigation and outreach infrastructure and implementation in your
state?
12. Looking ahead, what challenges do you anticipate?
13. Is there anything else you would like to tell me that may be important for
my study? Is there anything we did not ask about that you think is
important?
14. Can you suggest other people or groups I should talk to in your state about
these topics?
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